Skip to main content
Version: Next (unreleased)

Redaction & Fingerprints

sqlguard's findings flow into logs. A query like SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = 'ceo@example.com' is exactly the query most likely to trip a rule, and the literal in it is exactly what must not reach a log sink. So by default no Result leaves the process with a literal value in it. This is a security invariant, not a formatting choice — see the repository's SECURITY.md.

What redaction does​

analyzer.Redact is a zero-dependency lexical pass over the SQL:

  • Comments (-- and /* */) are stripped.
  • Every single-quoted string literal becomes ?, honoring both '' and \' escapes.
  • Every dollar-quoted string ($$…$$, $tag$…$tag$) becomes ?. $1 / $2 bind placeholders are left alone.
  • Every numeric literal becomes ?, including hex (0x1F) and binary (0b1011) forms.
  • Keywords, structure, and identifiers — including "double-quoted" and `backtick` names — are preserved.

It never errors; unparseable input still comes out with its literals gone.

Changed in 0.3. Only the '' escape was honored before, so a literal containing \' closed at the wrong quote and the scanner then copied the following literal's contents out as query structure. Numeric redaction stopped at the radix prefix, leaving 0x4142 as ?x4142 — the payload intact. Added in 0.3. Dollar-quoted strings were not recognised at all and passed through whole.

in: SELECT * FROM "users" WHERE email = 'a@b.c' AND age > 30 -- vip
out: SELECT * FROM "users" WHERE email = ? AND age > ?

When the dialect is ambiguous, it over-redacts​

Dialects disagree about whether a backslash escapes a quote. MySQL's default sql_mode and PostgreSQL's E'…' strings say yes; PostgreSQL with standard_conforming_strings says the backslash is an ordinary byte. The two readings disagree about where a literal ends, and picking the wrong one desynchronises the lexer — it closes a literal at the wrong quote and then emits the next literal's contents as if they were query structure.

So Redact scans under both readings and redacts the union. A byte that is inside a literal under either reading is replaced:

in: SELECT * FROM t WHERE path = 'C:\' AND secret = 'hunter2'
out: SELECT * FROM t WHERE path = ?

That output has lost the AND secret = structure, which is the deliberate trade: losing structure costs readability, and under-redacting leaks a value. SQL with no backslash in it is unambiguous, scans identically under both readings, and is unaffected.

One consequence is worth knowing about, because it reaches past readability: an over-redacted query has a different fingerprint from the same query with an unambiguous value. Above, p = 'C:\' folds to … WHERE p = ? while p = 'plain' folds to … WHERE p = ? AND id = ?. So a query whose values only sometimes end in a backslash — Windows paths, LIKE … ESCAPE patterns, regexes — groups under two fingerprints instead of one. That splits N+1 counts across both (a run that would trip a threshold of 20 may land as 12 and 8 and trip neither) and lets the de-duplicator emit the same finding once per group. Bind parameters avoid it entirely, and are the better answer for those values anyway.

Double quotes depend on the dialect​

A "double-quoted" run is an identifier in PostgreSQL, ANSI SQL and MySQL under ANSI_QUOTES, but MySQL's default sql_mode also reads it as a string literal. So what sqlguard does with one depends on the dialect:

Dialect"users""alice@example.com"
PostgreSQLkeptkept (it can only be a name)
MySQL??
unknownkept?

Changed in 0.6. Before, every double-quoted run was kept, so on MySQL a value written as "…" reached the log. With the dialect unknown, a run is now kept only when it looks like an identifier: ASCII letters, digits, _ and $, not starting with a digit. Anything else is redacted, which costs readability on an unusual quoted name such as "Order Details". A value that itself looks like a name is still kept with the dialect unknown: "alice", but also a token such as "sk_live_51Habc". On MySQL, set the dialect, or use '…' or bind parameters for values. An unterminated " is redacted to the end of the query in every dialect. Backticks are always identifiers.

Under MySQL with ANSI_QUOTES, "…" is an identifier, so a MySQL analyzer over-redacts names there. That is the safe direction.

The dialect hint​

Added in 0.6. The gaps above exist because the lexer does not know the dialect unless told. An analyzer carries one (analyzer.Dialect: unknown, postgres or mysql), resolved once when it is built. It decides the double quotes above; the backslash case is not dialect-aware yet.

You rarely set it yourself. In order, the first of these that names a dialect wins:

  1. middleware.WithDialect(d) in Go.
  2. dialect: in .sqlguard.yml.
  3. A single-dialect parser: pgparser or mysqlparser.
  4. Detection: the pgx, lib/pq and go-sql-driver/mysql drivers behind Register, OpenDB, WrapDriver and WrapConnector; pgxguard (always Postgres); sqlxguard and entguard from the driver name; and gormguard from the dialector. bunguard and xormguard cannot see the database when they are built, so pass WithDialect there.

A driver behind another wrapper, or SQLite, stays unknown, which keeps the dialect-agnostic behaviour described above.

Result.Query is set from Redact centrally in Analyzer.Analyze, and a slow-query finding goes through Analyzer.PrepareQuery, which applies the same policy. An n-plus-one finding describes a pattern rather than one execution, so its Query is the fingerprint. There is one normalizer in the codebase; nothing re-implements it.

Fingerprints​

Every Result also carries Fingerprint: the redacted query with whitespace collapsed, IN (?, ?, ?) and VALUES (?, ?) lists folded to (?), and a trailing ; trimmed.

SELECT id FROM t WHERE x IN (1, 2, 3) → SELECT id FROM t WHERE x IN (?)
SELECT id FROM t WHERE x IN (4, 5) → SELECT id FROM t WHERE x IN (?)
SELECT id\n FROM t\n WHERE x = 'a'; → SELECT id FROM t WHERE x = ?

A fingerprint is:

  • Stable — the same query shape always yields the same string.
  • PII-free — it is derived from the redacted form.
  • Low-cardinality — literals and list lengths do not create new values.

That makes it safe as a metrics label, a log key, or a grouping key in your observability stack. It is the value the N+1 tracker groups on and the de-duplicator keys on. The JSON reporter emits it as fingerprint. To compute one yourself, call Fingerprint(sql) on the configured analyzer (Guard.Analyzer()), which reads "…" in its dialect; the package-level analyzer.Fingerprint(sql) always uses the unknown dialect, so on MySQL the two can differ.

Fingerprint is always populated, whether or not redaction is on.

Opting out​

Only where the query text is trusted — local debugging, a test — you can keep the raw SQL in Result.Query:

a := analyzer.Default().WithRawQuery()
sqlguard.Register("sqlguard-pg", "pgx", middleware.WithAnalyzer(a))

or in .sqlguard.yml:

redact: false

WithRawQuery returns a copy; the original analyzer is unchanged. Do not ship this to production.

The one deliberate exception​

The EXPLAIN analyzer keeps Result.Query raw. The user typed the query on their own command line; it goes back to their own terminal and never reaches a log or telemetry sink. Fingerprint is still set. The exception is scoped to explain only.

Using it in your own reporter​

type metricsReporter struct{ counter *prometheus.CounterVec }

func (m *metricsReporter) Report(rs []analyzer.Result) {
for _, r := range rs {
m.counter.WithLabelValues(r.RuleName, r.Fingerprint).Inc()
}
}

RuleName and Fingerprint are the two fields designed to be labels. Query is for humans and Message for context; neither should be a metric dimension.